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1. INTRODUCTION
The government or public sector of mostnations typically accounts for between one-
quarter and one-half of all economic activity. Yet
the criteria that we evaluate the effectiveness of
such services is not automatic, as it is in private
business enterprise due to the disciplining effect
of the market, but must be imposed. Democratic
mechanisms function to both reward and disci-
pline political parties and thus to create incen-
tives to improve public services. However, in the
short run, the evaluation of the management and
provision of public assets and services rely on cri-
teria of efficiency. 
There is a vast literature on the economics of
government services, optimal policy, social and
public choice theory and political economy that is
based on a framework of instruments and targets,
or mechanisms and goals, as evaluated in terms of
efficiency. This is both in terms of the goal (e.g.
Pareto efficiency for an allocative goal) and also
the means by which it is achieved, such that some
mechanisms may be more efficient than others in
achieving the same goal (e.g. an income distribu-
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tion target, or a target level of production of a
service). It is thus a widely held axiom that public
sector management of assets and provision of serv-
ices is properly evaluated as effective when it is
judged to be efficient. In consequence, improve-
ments in the management of public assets and in
the provision of public services are then implicitly
defined as anything that renders these services
more efficient (or less inefficient). 
However, this evaluation criterion is only
meaningfully defined with respect to assets and
services that already exist. It excludes from the
outset criteria that relate to the innovation of new
services or even the elimination of services
because the efficiency criterion is meaningless in
such cases. This, in essence, is why innovation is
difficult in the public sector. The goal of efficien-
cy is inconsistent with the goal of innovation. Put
differently, this is why one-half to three-quarters
of the economy remains in the private sector
where this inconsistency does not hold.   
Now although considerations of economic effi-
ciency do not of course entirely determine the
nature and shape of all public policy and govern-
ment actions – for these are also driven by political
expediencies, citizen pressures and realpolitik – it
remains a widely held axiom of both effective poli-
cy and good governance that to go strongly against
considerations of economic efficiency makes for
bad policy. This is easily witnessed in public
demand for, and government accord with, the gen-
eral sensibilities of transparency, accountability and
efficiency in the conduct of government economic
intervention in the drafting of regulation, the use
of public money and the management of public
assets. Yet I shall argue here against this seemingly
sensible proposition by noting the implications of
it going too far: indeed, I shall specifically argue
the benefits of a reduction in efficiency. 
I am of course not arguing that public policy
and governance can be improved by a significant
increase in inefficiency, in the sense of indiscrimi-
nate waste and corruption. Rather, I seek to dis-
criminate between different sorts of waste (as the
opposite of efficiency). I shall distinguish between
‘bad waste’ due to rent-seeking and ‘good waste’ as
the cost of experimentation. I shall then argue
that the much vaunted aspiration toward univer-
sal efficiency in the public sector has indeed suc-
cessfully eliminated much ‘bad waste’, but at the
price of also eliminating much ‘good waste’ as
well. And in doing so, it has constricted innova-
tion. I shall seek to explain the logic of how this
situation has arisen, why it is a problem, and
what might be done to remedy it.          
2. GOVERNMENT IS A SERVICE
Our starting point is that government (and gover-
nance in general) is a service. It provides services
of defence, law and order, transport and commu-
nications infrastructure, health services, education
services, social services, regulatory services, and so
on. Some of these services can of course be pro-
vided wholly or in part by the private sector, but
there are often good reasons associated with infor-
mation asymmetries, free-rider problems or diffi-
culty of defining and enforcing property rights
that underpin a ‘market failure’ rationale for pub-
lic supply of such services. The point remains,
however, that although government is outside the
‘price mechanism’ in these circumstances it is not
outside ‘the economy’. Rather, it is still funda-
mentally part of the economy as a provider of
valuable services. That is why it is legitimate to
talk about the efficiency of government services.
Yet this is also why it is equally legitimate to talk
about uncertainty, enterprise and innovation in
the economics of government services.
At this point, however, debate usually fixes on
the question of comparative efficiency: i.e. for
any given service (say geriatric health care), and
for given citizen or consumer preferences and
incomes, what then is the most efficient way of
achieving that goal? But in formulating the ques-
tion in this way we have implicitly presumed to
deal with a static conception of both govern-
ment and the economy. We have implicitly pre-
sumed that: (a) there is one best way of
achieving the goal efficiently; (b) that it is
known or knowable by someone; and (c) that
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this best solution can then be rationally chosen
and implemented. Any failure along this line
leads to inefficiency, which is of course bad. Yet
note that, in this view, there is no place for
innovation. Innovation, along with uncertainty,
entrepreneurship, imagination, experimentation,
competitive enterprise and technological and
structural change are excluded, by definition,
because of the initial presumption that the one
best solution is already known (or knowable)
and that the problem effectively lies only in its
implementation. The rational pursuit of effi-
ciency denies the very existence of innovation. 
Of course there is no shortage of recognition of
the need for innovation in the provision of public
services (Golden 1990; Osbourne 1998a, 1998b;
Newman et al 2001; Bhatta 2003; Mulgan and
Albury 2003; Walker 2003, 2006; Kanarck 2004;
Hartley 2005; Albury 2005). Furthermore, eco-
nomic commentators are often resolute about the
need for efficiency in public services while simul-
taneously making perennial calls for the promo-
tion of innovation in public services. Yet there is
little recognition that these two goals are mutually
inconsistent (Parsons 2006).
This is a curious situation, as the study of
innovation in services is a well-developed compo-
nent of industrial economic analysis (e.g. Gallouj
and Weinstein 1997, Metcalfe and Miles 2000,
OECD 2001, Tether 2003, Miles 2004) and a
significant explanation for economic growth (e.g.
Riddle 1986, Romer 1994). There is a broad
understanding in the economics of innovation
literature that the innovation process requires
experimentation and a high tolerance over organ-
izations and institutions for both risk-taking and
failure (Dodgson et al 2005). Yet the pursuit of
efficiency involves, effectively, the very opposite
of this, namely risk aversion, intolerance for
experimentation, and a preference for proven
‘winners’. It is surprising, therefore, that this basic
point has seemingly been so widely overlooked in
the analysis of public sector innovation.  
The incentives and outcomes in the ‘produc-
tion of public services’ industry (i.e. government)
in stable modern ‘rule of law’ democracies are
now often efficient, transparent and accountable,
yet the incentives and outcomes to innovation
remain exceedingly poor (Albury 2005). One
possible explanation is that government is a
monopoly service provider and, like all monopo-
lies, experiences little pressure to innovate
(Schumpeter 1945). Yet this argument is flawed.
Monopolies do innovate, and often powerfully
because there are very few entirely ‘uncontestable’
monopolies (Baumol 2002, Dopfer and Potts
2008). A local or national government does have
an effective monopoly on a range of services at a
point in time, yet in a democratic system this
monopoly will be periodically contested. Further-
more, leadership in the upper-management of
such monopolies is also highly contestable,
engendering implicit competition between aspir-
ing managers in the creation and promotion of
new ideas.  Thus we have a puzzle. Governance is
a service and, in a competitive or contestable
environment, services must continually innovate
to survive. Yet while it is now broadly accepted in
principle and increasingly in practice that govern-
ment services should aim for levels of efficiency
on par with private sector organizations, there is
little corresponding recognition that the parallel
aim for innovation in government services that is
on par with innovation practices and outcomes
achieved in the market service economy is a fun-
damental contradiction. The goal of efficiency
‘crowds out’ the goal of innovation.
As such, a plausible explanation for the widely
observed and much lamented deficit of innova-
tion in government services is that it is a by-
product of the drive to efficiency and the
elimination of both ‘good waste’ as well as ‘bad
waste’. In other words, in a system governed by
public accountability that is premised on the
achievement of efficiency and innovation you
will either get efficiency or innovation, but not
both. There are no simple solutions to this,
although I will detail some possible ways forward
that involve a re-assessment of what is meant and
implied by public accountability. But first, con-
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sider why this is a non-trivial and non-conver-
gent (i.e. endemic) problem.
3. AN EVOLVING ECONOMY REQUIRES
EVOLVING POLICY
Economic growth and structural change is a ‘nor-
mal process’ that occurs when a certain minimal
set of institutional conditions and freedoms pre-
vail. Furthermore, the process of economic
growth is never just a simple scaling-up of exist-
ing activities and structures, but involves endoge-
nous transformation of the economy from within
as new technologies, business plans and suchlike
are originated, adopted and retained by the eco-
nomic system. This creative–destructive process is
known as economic evolution (Nelson and Winter
1982, Metcalfe 1998, Loasby 1999, Potts 2000,
Beinhocker 2006, Dopfer and Potts 2008). Eco-
nomic evolution is caused by economic innova-
tion. It results in structural change in the
economic system in consequence of new ideas,
along with change in the capabilities, organiza-
tion, connections, boundaries and behaviour of
the micro units that compose the economic sys-
tem and the connections between them. 
An economic system in equilibrium (i.e. one
that is not evolving) has no need of new policy,
for it will be in equilibrium with respect to the
extant policy settings and services provided. Also,
an economy that is growing in the manner envis-
aged in neoclassical growth models (in which the
economy expands equally and everywhere by
some percentage each year) has no need of new
policy or services, because the same public servic-
es can then be provided at a similarly expanded
level. This would happen automatically as the tax
base grew proportionately. Public sector innova-
tion is thus unnecessary in an economy in equi-
librium or an economy experiencing equilibrium
(scaled-up) growth. In such a context, public sec-
tor efficiency is the only economic concern. 
Yet this is neither necessarily nor even general-
ly true in an evolving economy because evolu-
tionary growth, by definition, implies change in
the underlying capabilities and relations between
agents changing the structure of the economic
order. In an evolving economy, a static (or
scaled) structure of policy and services will
become increasingly dysfunctional or inappropri-
ate. It will be adapted to an economic world
that, by increment, no longer exists. Economic
evolution thus renders extant policy settings
increasingly dysfunctional. Let us call this policy
entropy. Policy entropy does not exist in a static
economy, and thus requires no innovation. But
an evolving economy requires policy innovation
and not just the increased efficiency or scaling-
up of existing policy. 
The process of innovation and economic evo-
lution continually changes the economic order
from within, and hence needs to be met with a
continuous flow of novel policy ideas, including
the termination of old ideas that no longer work
or are devolving into sources of rent. Yet because
economic evolution is the product of novelty and
the growth of knowledge (Loasby 1999) new pol-
icy will need to be experimentally created and test-
ed. Its efficacy cannot be known a priori for the
same reason that new private sector enterprises
and services cannot be known a priori. Experi-
mentation will be necessary and its costs will be
unavoidable. It is these experimental costs associ-
ated with policy innovation that directly clash
with the goals of static efficiency in policy.  
Naturally some and perhaps many policy
experiments (Leigh 2003) will fail, and some-
times expensively. Yet this is an essential price to
pay for governance and policy to simply keep
pace with an evolving economy. Economic evolu-
tion implies policy entropy which thus requires
policy innovation just to maintain current service
(a point we return to below as the ‘Red Queen’
hypothesis). Policy innovation is not therefore
only about ‘going forward’ in pursuit of better
governance as it is often sold, but rather, as a
base-line case, is about simply maintaining posi-
tion. The upshot is that in an evolving economy,
the strident pursuit of policy efficiency may actu-
ally result in less effective or well-adapted policy.      
This sort of dynamic efficiency with respect to
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policy is necessary in an evolving economy. Yet
the governance of a complex evolving system is
often stifled by a zero-risk attitude to governance
that is incentivized to that position in the short
run by the widely perceived need to be efficient:
in the sense of being transparent, accountable,
precautionary, fair and equitable. Yet for policy to
be effective, it must keep pace with ongoing eco-
nomic change, which means that it must inno-
vate, which then places it in direct contradiction
to many of these aspects of efficiency. However,
that does not change the underlying fact that an
innovative evolving economy requires, indeed
mandates, an innovative approach to policy.
How, then, might this dilemma be resolved?   
4. GOOD WASTE AND BAD WASTE
The upshot is that continuous innovation is
required for policy and government services to
remain effective in an evolving economy. Yet
innovation is by definition wasteful because good
policy solutions and service provisions cannot be
known in advance. Yet we need more, not less, of
this sort of waste.
To be clear, efficiency is indisputably good, but
the opposite of efficiency is not always bad. An
important distinction thus needs to be made
between good waste (the necessary but unknown
costs of experimentation) and bad waste (the costs
of inefficiency). Bad waste is the consequence of
rent-seeking that comes by degrees of corruption
and exploitation of power. This is well understood,
and the mark of good governance is the absence of
such waste, i.e. static efficiency. Good waste, on
the other hand is less well understood and indeed
often unrecognized, yet it is the natural conse-
quence of experiments in the course of innovation
in developing new ideas, technologies or policies.
This is the cost of learning that is systematically
factored into research and development budgets,
for example, or in the amortized costs of learning
about new technologies or market opportunities.
Many of the most successful and profitable compa-
nies produce large quantities of ‘good waste’, and
are often as such precisely because they have learnt
how to effectively do so (Dodgson et al 2005).
Good governance, in this view, thus involves mini-
mizing bad waste from rent-seeking and maximiz-
ing good waste from experimentation.
Waste therefore arises from a failure to organ-
ize and use scarce resources efficiently: thus gov-
ernment waste, in this view, is bad governance.
This may arise due to information imperfections,
organizational slack, rent-seeking and corruption,
institutional friction, transaction costs, market
failure, government failures, abuse of power,
rationality failures and the full complement of
potential failures of the competitive market out-
come. These are all bad waste in the sense that
they are Pareto inefficient, meaning that changes
could be made to make some agents better off
without making others worse off. Things could
be better, yet the natural and artificial limitations
of material reality intervene, causing waste. The
solution, then, is to remove these imperfections
and frictions by promoting efficiency. Bad waste
thus always involves rent-seeking and invariably
results in sub-optimal resource allocations. Some-
times this is obvious, as in persistent market
shortages or artificially high prices, or when dubi-
ous or illegal dealings are revealed. The waste
from such activities is morally unambiguous and
rightfully prosecuted. 
Yet there are lesser and more everyday forms of
waste that while no less wasteful in proportion are
now widely, yet inappropriately from the evolu-
tionary perspective, afforded the mantle of good
governance. I refer here to the systematic tenden-
cy toward risk aversion that comes to distrust the
entrepreneurial gamble or the experimental
endeavour because it might fail to meet specific
expectations based on knowable extrapolations of
extant conditions that would render it unac-
countable. In essence, it is the distrust of imagi-
nation with public resources. This is the point of
much confusion of bad waste and good waste. 
This form of distrust is more politely known
as transparency and accountability. Yet it leads
inexorably to a creeping strangulation of risk that
can ossify the governance structures of a compa-
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ny, city, region or nation. When this happens, the
cost is the loss of the ability of the governed sys-
tem to change and grow through imaginative
experimental endeavour in order to meet new
environmental threats and opportunities. The
result is a fragile system (Parsons 2006). This is of
course subtle and opaque, but by degrees it is all
bad waste. Accountability in this context only
ever extends to failures of practice, never to fail-
ures of imagination. Yet it is simple arithmetic
that large amounts of small corruption are as sig-
nificant as small amounts of large corruption. Yet
only the latter attracts media, civic, shareholder
or voter attention. The implication is that the
drive to increased transparency and accountabili-
ty to promote efficiency and to fight egregious
corruption has had an unfortunate side-effect by
inducing a kind of ‘soft corruption’ – by which I
mean corruption in the sense of increasing dys-
function of a system, not as a moral failing – to
favour the known quantity and the sure-thing
that works to promote a systematic aversion to
uncertainty, risk and experimentation. The pres-
ent demands of efficiency thus quietly, and with
all best intentions, slowly strangle the ongoing
possibility of innovation.           
This brings us to the other sort of waste – good
waste – which is a natural consequence of learn-
ing and experimentation. Waste is inevitable, not
just because of the second law of thermodynam-
ics, but also because of how economies and soci-
eties evolve and progress through differential
growth (Metcalfe 1998). All economic growth is
a consequence of the ongoing process of variation
and selection of the ideas and knowledge of an
economy that define what it does and what it can
do (Potts 2000, Dopfer et al 2004, Dopfer and
Potts 2008). New ideas are the origin of econom-
ic growth and are produced through a process of
trying many ideas and then learning from what
doesn’t work and replicating what does (Loasby
1999). Theory and analysis do of course help in
this process, but the best way to grow a company,
region or economy is still to try lots of things and
then select from what works. This can of course
be guided by theory and principles, and so will be
far from random. But in an open world it will
still require experimentation, and experimenta-
tion necessarily involves waste (Ormerod 2005). 
But this is good waste, and indeed is a necessary
waste for a progressive and growing economy or
society. Public goods are created by a process that
begins with political entrepreneurship and enter-
prise and ends with an ongoing order (i.e. a firm
organized about an idea or technology or a
bureaucracy organized about a policy). Except
when it doesn’t, which is when an idea has failed.
Yet this ‘operational expense’ is not a ‘generic loss’
if lessons can be learned; which will be true to the
extent that the endeavour was appropriately con-
ceived as an experiment from the start (Burtless
1995, Leigh 2003). Good waste is the conse-
quence of experimentation that leads to learning
that then feeds back into innovation in gover-
nance and opportunity. Learning naturally
involves mistakes and post-hoc waste. 
Yet being wasteful in an effective way is hard:
it is not easy to ‘waste’ money well. Best practise
is always to spend public or shareholder money in
a transparent, accountable and efficient manner.
It is easy to do what the average voter wants,
which is, by the very definition of the arithmetic
mean, to not take risks. Those who support risk-
taking experimentation are always in the tails of
the distribution. As such, the natural demands of
transparency and accountability will tend to
induce corporate, civil and public offices toward
the risk adverse centre and away from imagina-
tion, uncertainty and experimentation. This is a
rational strategy and the failing here is institu-
tional, not personal. Yet the cost is born publicly,
as good governance is associated with the promo-
tion of efficiency and the avowal of the sorts of
imagination-led risk-taking experiments that pro-
duce innovation. 
It is of course far from my intention here to
present or develop this argument as a critique of
democracy. Rather, what I wish to emphasise is
that within any democratic system of the public
organization of asset ownership, management
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and service provision there are systematic biases
against innovation that function through the pro-
motion of public accountability and efficiency.
Occasionally, of course, a charismatic leader can
overcome these inherent biases and lead their
people down a path of experimentation with full
cognition of the risks and uncertainties involved.
Yet these situations are rare and often correlated
with desperate contexts linked to immediate
threats. The fair-weather entrepreneurial politi-
cian remains a rare species. 
The implication is that entrepreneurial inno-
vation in public policy is discounted due to a
public aggregate of what in behavioural econom-
ics is called ‘loss aversion’, or the tendency to
value a statistically equivalent expected loss high-
er than the corresponding statistical gain. This
paradox functions for known gains and losses,
and is proportionately higher for unknown
potential gains and losses. In terms of both indi-
vidual rationality and social democracy, we all
systematically underestimate the gains from nov-
elty. Put differently, it is entirely human to over-
estimate the costs of ‘good waste’ and to
underestimate potential gains from experimental
learning. This is why efficiency is an easy political
sell, but why innovation is hard. It is why effi-
ciency and innovation seem logically connected
when in fact they are not. It is why there remains
a persistent innovation deficit in democratically
organized public services.                 
5. EVOLVING POLICY
So, what might be done to remedy this seeming-
ly intrinsic state of affairs? On one hand, there is
an important role for public education about
the actual nature of the need for policy experi-
mentation based on the reality of economic evo-
lution and its socio-cultural correlates in order
to create a public climate of trust and willing-
ness to proceed in such experimental ways along
with the promotion of a tolerance of legitimate
failure. This is obviously a fine line, as the very
conditions implicit in this bargain are also the
conditions that lead to the encroachment of
unaccountable power. Accountability is vital, yet
absolute accountability crowds out imagination
and experimentation. The balance must then turn
on accountability of process. But what is this?  
The logical form of such a contract is an adap-
tive or evolutionary policy-making framework,
which involves accepting at the outset that some
of the things tried will fail (see Pelikan and Weg-
ner 2003). But, rather than focusing on the mini-
mization of the risks associated with such failure,
it is better to focus on the possibility and
prospect of successful experiments. Policy rules
then enter to ramp-up those initiatives that were
successful into an ongoing process, and to then
renew the process with new experiments in new
directions updated by the knowledge acquired
from the last round of experiments. Such an
empirically adaptive policy approach would also
be scientific policy. Yet like all scientific experi-
ments, it would need to build into its expecta-
tions from the outset the near certainty that some
failure will occur. Yet by properly accounting for
failure, the prospect of innovation may become
routine, not exceptional. 
In other words, governments that can learn to
take risks, and accept that perhaps much will fail
in the short run, will succeed in the long run.
The same is of course true and plainly observable
of firms and, indeed, of people. Risk is essential
to the renewal and regeneration of variety, and
therefore to the growth of regions and companies
alike. The purposeful and noble act of avoiding
the immediate waste of public money through
the promotion of efficiency may therefore actual-
ly lead to the long run waste of public money if it
then leads to a loss of appetite for risk. The same
argument can be made about shareholders seek-
ing full accountability for short term returns. A
good director is not always a good democrat, as
neither should be a good civic leader. They
should listen to the tails of the distribution as
well, and perhaps even with prejudice, for these
are where new ideas come from. And new ideas,
once adopted, make for new voter averages. 
No one likes being experimented on without
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their knowing, but we each and all regularly put
ourselves in these positions for both utility and
profit when the experiment is self-selected or
complicit. There is no inherent reason that a
body politic would not accept or even embrace
adaptive policy experimentation if it is explained
and accepted that that is what is occurring. Full
disclosure is thus not inconsistent with limited
accountability or political liability. (Note the
comparison with the invention of limited liability
trading companies and the onset of market capi-
talism as a force of innovation: no such political
analogue yet exists, i.e. the ‘limited liability’ polit-
ical experiment.) Instead, problems only arise
when it is simultaneously insisted that this will
not result in any failure or (good) waste. Yet that
impossible bargain is often sold with the result of
systematic political failure (cf. market failure) due
to lack of innovation.
It is an axiom of conservative thinking that the
greatest damage a government can do is to waste
public money. Yet, from the evolutionary per-
spective, there is something potentially worse:
namely the failure to promote or to learn from
experimentation, thus resulting in a political or
bureaucratic order increasingly divergent from
the evolving economic order (Hayek 1960,
Buchanan 2006). The propensity toward not tak-
ing risks, and the corresponding inability to
accept experimental failure, thus begins a down-
ward spiral toward a slow strangulation and swal-
lowing of the resources under governance.
Eventually, and often inevitably, this will end in a
blaze of rent-seeking once the opportunity is
enclosed and captured. This is precisely the out-
come that the focus on efficiency is intended to
avoid, yet which by the incentivized neglect of
policy innovation in an evolving economy even-
tually all but guarantees. The strategic rent seek-
ing popularly thought to be overcome by the
mandates of transparency and efficiency is, in this
view, better realized through a mandate to experi-
mental policy learning and innovation. 
The promotion of public sector risk-taking is
the basic antidote to such an entropic position in
which the cost of ‘good waste’ is the evolutionary
outcome of rational experimentation in the dis-
covery of new opportunities and better policies.
‘Bad waste’ remains as it always was, namely
something to be avoided. But it should not be
confused with the innovation costs of political
experimental endeavour. Bad waste has only pub-
lic cost (with private benefit to those who corrupt-
ed the institution in their specific favour). Yet
good waste, while publicly costly, may also be a
necessary condition for public benefit in the form
of policy innovation. In both scenarios there is
public waste, i.e. public resources devoted to
things that did not work out. Yet the difference is
whether these benefits accrue privately or publicly.
So while inescapably ‘political’, the driving
principles of adaptive policy should be properly
‘experimental’ and subject to strict methodologi-
cal protocols (Burtless 1995, Leigh 2003). This
should proceed in seeking to make conjectures
about what systems or actions will produce pub-
lic goods and then testing these hypotheses
through public action. The purpose of experi-
mentation is of course learning, followed by the
analysis of this new knowledge and its communi-
cation and distribution to the society or economy
under governance. 
In this respect, government reports should
then aim to be more like scientific papers, stating
what was proposed, what experimental condi-
tions held, and what was learnt. This sort of goal
is normally recognized as being achieved only by
research institutes, such as elite universities or
public sector research organizations, but it should
also be the goal of all systems with good gover-
nance to seek to develop new rules that might be
usefully adopted and used by others. Whether
this is driven by public or private organization is
immaterial. What matters is that the outcome of
the experimentation is appropriable learning
about what creates value and how that can be
applied. Civic and political leaders, as trustees of
public wealth, should always seek to be great
experimenters as well as great bureaucrats. The
solution to the innovation deficit, in other words,
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is for political leaders to publicly act more like
scientists, or political entrepreneurs, and for the
public to learn to appreciate that role and to dis-
criminate (at the ballot box, ultimately) their suc-
cess or otherwise in doing so.   
6. THE ‘RED QUEEN’ OF
EVOLUTIONARY PUBLIC GOOD
In this view, the efficient production of waste is
an evolutionary public good. Policy should then
seek to be experimental in proportion to the
rate and depth of economic change. In a static
economy or ‘closed society’, there is no need for
policy innovation, only policy efficiency. How-
ever, in an evolving economy or open society,
policy and governance must continually experi-
ment and innovate ‘just to keep up’. This con-
cept is known as the ‘Red Queen’ hypothesis in
evolutionary biology (Ridley 1995) and argues,
essentially, that a fitness increase in one system
(e.g. the economy, due to innovation, i.e. ‘run-
ning faster’) will tend to lead to a fitness
decrease in another system (e.g. government,
due to lack of innovation, i.e. effectively ‘run-
ning slower’ even though nothing changed). I
have suggested here that the ‘Red Queen
hypothesis’ has a corollary in the need for pub-
lic policy to be continually innovative just to
stay in the same place with respect to the
opportunity space of an evolving economy. Fail-
ure to achieve this will, in the limit, result in an
accretion of rent-seeking that will eventually
consume the systems it governs. 
In biology, the mechanism by which this Red
Queen process happens is sexual selection. In
economics, it is market selection. In a democrat-
ic systems of governance, it is voter selection. In
an open system, this leads to a positive feedback
process in which competition proceeds by inno-
vation: in biology, this is called an ‘arms race’; in
economics is it called the competitive process;
and in politics it is called democracy. Yet in biol-
ogy, economics and politics, dominance and
power are regularly used to close a system to
competition and feedback so as to maximize the
exploitation of rents through the pursuit of effi-
ciency. This paper has argued that the mainte-
nance of a viable balance between the economy
and the systems of governance that support it
necessarily requires ongoing policy innovation.
This is an experimental process that will, natu-
rally, be wasteful. Yet that is not a bad thing, but
rather is the evolutionary price that must be
paid to maintain the very possibility of public
sector viability and efficient governance in an
open society.
Economists are sometimes prone to sweeping
laissez faire arguments that discount all prospect
of government endeavour to create and maintain
public goods or to deny any possibility of effi-
ciency in the management of public money.
From the open system evolutionary/complexity
perspective, however, the argument is somewhat
different. Politics has evolved in a world of rela-
tively slow change (Rubin 2002) in the tech-
nologies of economic systems (Beinhocker
2006), yet it is now very much the growth of
knowledge through the market system that now
drives the pace of human systems, and it is poli-
cy systems that must now run just to keep up.
Recent decades have witnessed this disjunction
in monetary and finance policy, media policy,
immigration policy, climate policy, and so on. In
an evolving economy, there will be an ongoing
need for new policy solutions. The current
incentive structure to the management of public
assets and services, which is based about effi-
ciency in terms of transparency and accountabil-
ity, permits no rationalization of waste. Yet
without such deliberate experimental waste (or
dynamic investment) otherwise viable gover-
nance structures will eventually and inevitably
be rendered non-viable by economic evolution.
Economic evolution thus systematically induces
policy entropy that can only be resolved through
policy innovation, thus mandating both policy
experimentation and operational waste. When
the economy evolves, then so must policy. This
is the proper and fundamental significance of
innovation policy.
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